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Careful With That Gun:
Lee, George, Wax, and Geach on
Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage
Andrew Koppelman*

About half of Americans think that homosexual sex is
morally wrong.1 More than half oppose same-sex marriage.2
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political
Science, Northwestern University. Thanks to Marcia Lehr and Michelle
Shaw for research assistance, and to June Carbone, Mary Anne Case, Mary
Geach, Martha Nussbaum, and Dorothy Roberts for helpful comments.
1
This number is however shrinking. The Gallup poll found in 1982 that
only 34 percent of respondents agreed that “homosexuality should be
considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle.” The number increased
to 50 percent in 1999 and 57 percent in 2007. Lydia Saad, Americans
Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, June 18, 2008, available
at http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-MoralityHomosexuality.aspx (visited April 27, 2009). In 2001, 53% of Americans
thought that homosexual relations were morally wrong, while 40%
considered them morally acceptable; in 2008, the split was 48 to 48.
Id.
2
According to Gallup, 57% oppose same-sex marriage. Jeffrey M. Jones,
Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, May 27, 2009,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/Majority-AmericansContinue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx (visited Oct. 14, 2009). But there
is a sharp generational divide: among those 18 to 34 years old, 58
percent supported same-sex marriages. That number drops to 42 percent
among respondents aged 35 to 49, to 41 percent of those aged 50 to 64,
and only 24 percent of Americans 65 and older. Paul Steinhauser, CNN
Poll: Generations Disagree on Same-Sex Marriage, May 4, 2009,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/04/samesex.marriage.poll/
(visited July 2, 2009). Other polls reach similar results. Arian
Campo-Flores, A Gay Marriage Surge, Newsweek, Dec. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/172399 (visited July 2, 2009); Adam
Nagourney, On Politics: Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking Stance on Gay
Marriage, Apr. 28, 2008. The effect is even noticeable among white
evangelical Christians, otherwise a very conservative lot: 58 percent
of those 18-29 years old support some legal recognition of same-sex
couples, with 26 percent supporting marriage rights. Only 46 percent
of those over 30 support any legal recognition, with 9 percent
supporting marriage. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc., Young
Evangelical Christians and the 2008 Election, Sept. 29 2008, available
at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID=2251 (visited Oct. 22,
2009). Older evangelicals also care much more about the issue:
according to a Pew Forum study, 61.8 percent of those over 60 said that
“stopping gay marriage” was very important, while only 34 percent of
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Philosophers trying to defend these views have relied on
two strategies. One is to claim that such sex is wrong
irrespective of consequences: there is something intrinsic
to sex that makes it only licit when it takes place within
a heterosexual marriage (in which there is no contraception
or possibility of divorce). This argument‟s weakness is
that it moves so quickly from premise to conclusion:
unless you perceive marriage, as defined in this peculiar
way, to be intrinsically good, the argument can‟t even get
started. The second strategy focuses on consequences: the
baleful effects on heterosexual families of societal
tolerance for homosexuality. This argument has foundered
for lack of evidence.3
This article is a critique of recent attempts to
reinvigorate these strategies. Patrick Lee and Robert P.
George have offered clarifications of the first strategy in
order to rebut objections from many scholars. Amy Wax (who
is not a clear opponent of same-sex marriage, but who is
worried by it) has tried to array evidence to support the
second. Mary Geach has developed a novel hybrid, relying
on the second argument to support the first one.
The coherence problems of the first view remain. Its
deepest difficulty lies in its need to show that the
intrinsic goodness of sex is at once (a) derived from its
reproductive character and (b) present in the coitus of
married couples who know themselves to be infertile, but
not present in any sex act other than heterosexual marital
coitus.
As for evidence of bad consequences of tolerance of
homosexuality, the evidence is all the other way. The
sexual ethic all these authors revere is indeed decaying.
That is why they are alarmed. But it is its remnants that
are doing the most damage in contemporary society. The
growing tolerance of homosexuality is part of a larger
shift in sexual ethics that separates sex from
reproduction. The effects have been good for some groups
in American society and bad for others. The good effects
are concentrated among those who have most deeply absorbed
the new ethic. Within that population, children are
thriving, and they are thriving because their parents used
those 29 and under said so. Steven Waldman, Abortion vs.
Homosexuality: The Evangelical Age Gap,
http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/07/abortion-vshomosexuality-the.html (visited Oct. 22, 2009)(also citing similar data
from Barna Research).
3
I have previously examined both claims in The Decline and Fall of the
Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 5 (2005).
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contraception in their early 20s, prolonged their
educations, and delayed marriage and parenthood. Similar
behavior by more vulnerable populations would make them
better off. For opponents of homosexuality, relying on
consequences is building one‟s house on dynamite.
The intrinsic good of one-flesh union
Geach states the first claim succinctly: “the
marriage act has an intrinsic meaning which does not depend
on human convention, but which is part of the fabric and
constitution of our nature, so that by damaging our sense
of the significance of our sexuality we undermine that
fabric and undo that constitution.”4 Part of the meaning of
marriage as she understands it is that it is the only
legitimate use of the sexual function. Among the acts
which distort the meaning of the marriage act are sex
outside of marriage, contraception, divorce, masturbation,
sexual fantasy, and homosexual conduct. These are
categorically immoral, and never permissible under any
circumstances.
The view she puts forth has already been made
prominently by the new natural law theorists (hereinafter
NNL), the theologian Germain Grisez and the legal scholar
and philosopher John Finnis, and further developed by
Robert P. George, Gerard Bradley, and Patrick Lee.5 Central
to their argument is the view that sex is only morally
licit within marriage, which is “a basic and irreducible
good perfective of human persons.”6 I cannot review their
entire argument here,7 but will focus on their account of
4

Mary Geach, Lying With the Body, 91 The Monist 523, 525 (2008).
She acknowledges her affinity with NNL in id. at 527.
6
Robert P. George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It? Marriage, Morality,
and Rationality, in The Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market,
and Morals 142, 169 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds.,
2006).
7
I have done so elsewhere. See Koppelman, Decline and Fall; Andrew
Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 80-93
(2002); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 Am.
J. Jurisprudence 51 (1997). Since I wrote these pieces, Lee and George
have elaborated considerably on their claims about the disintegrating
effects of the pursuit of pleasure in Patrick Lee and Robert P. George,
Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (2007), and they
specifically respond to my objections in id. at 191-93. I cannot
address their general argument here. I note, however, that their
claims about the disordered character of nonmarital sex are parasitic
upon their claims, which I do address below, that there is a distinct
good achieved by the heterosexual couple, even if that couple is known
to be infertile. If that distinct good cannot intelligibly be shown,
5
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the distinctive good that they think is achieved by
heterosexual marriage.
Marriage, Grisez argues, is an irreducible human good,
because it constitutes “a full communion of persons: a
communion of will by mutual covenantal commitment, and of
organism by the generative act they share in”.8 Communion of
will consists of a mutual commitment to an exclusive and
indissoluble partnership, while organic communion consists
in the fact that – here comes the boldest move of the NNL
theorists, one that Geach does not make -- when husband and
wife engage in procreative marital intercourse, they
literally become a single organism.
For NNL “each animal is incomplete, for a male or a
female . . . is only a potential part of the mated pair,
which is the complete organism . . . capable of reproducing
sexually. This is true also of men and women: as mates who
engage in sexual intercourse suited to initiate new life,
they complete each other and become an organic unit. In
doing so, it is literally true that 'they become one flesh'
(Gn 2.24)”.9 What looks like a metaphor in Genesis becomes
a simple statement of fact in NNL. The married couple,
when mating, “truly become biologically one, one body.”10
Nonmarital sexual acts, whether homosexual or
heterosexual, cannot achieve this bodily unity. At best,
they achieve the illusory experience of unity. “For a
truly common good, there must be more than experience; the
experiences must be subordinated to a truly common act that
is genuinely fulfilling”.11 When gay couples (or even
married heterosexual couples) achieve sexual satisfaction
by means other than marital intercourse, the act “is really
an instance of mutual masturbation, and is as selfalienating as any other instance of masturbation.” Thus
Finnis writes of sex between unmarried people that
their reproductive organs cannot make them a
biological (and therefore personal) unit. . . .
Because their activation of . . . their
reproductive organs cannot be an actualizing and
experiencing of the marital good . . . it can do
no more than provide each partner with an
then, whatever the significance of pleasure might be, there is no
radical difference between marital heterosexual sex and other kinds of
sexual conduct.
8
Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2: Living a Christian
Life 580 (1993).
9
Id. at 570.
10
Lee and George, Body-Self Dualism, at 199.
11
Id. at 146.
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individual gratification. For want of a common
good that could be actualized . . . by and in
this bodily union, that conduct involves the
partners in treating their bodies as instruments
to be used in the service of their consciously
experiencing selves; their choice to engage in
such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them
precisely as acting persons.12
Homosexual acts are wrong not only because they
violate integrity, but also because they “violate the good
of marriage”.13 Choosing nonmarital sex “damages the body‟s
capacity for the marital act as an act of self-giving which
constitutes a communion of bodily persons.”14 This damage is
“a damage to the person as an integrated, acting being; it
consists principally in that disposition of the will which
is initiated by the choice to engage in” such sexual
activity.15 Consider a married man who has never committed
adultery, but who might be willing to do so if, say, his
wife were unavailable when he felt strong sexual desire.
The exclusivity of the man's sex with his wife is not an
expression of commitment, because conditional willingness
to commit adultery precludes commitment. He is thus
motivated even in marital intercourse by something other
than the good of marriage (which takes its meaning in part
from being the only legitimate use of the sexual powers).
This is why Finnis claims that the “complete exclusion of
nonmarital sex acts from the range of acceptable and
valuable human options is existentially, if not logically,
a precondition for the truly marital character of one‟s
intercourse as and with a spouse”.16 When one damages that
precondition, one damages marriage, since “to damage an
intrinsic and necessary condition for attaining a good is
to damage that good itself”.17
The new natural lawyers‟s claims have been subjected
to withering criticism.18 Here I will focus on just one
12

John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1049, 1066-67 (1994).
13
Grisez, 2 The Way of the Lord Jesus at 633.
14
Id. at 650.
15
John M. Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 Am. J.
Jurisprudence 97, 119 (1997).
16
Id. at 123.
17
Grisez, 2 The Way of the Lord Jesus, at 650-51.
18
Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 Geo. L.
J. 261 (1995); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A
Response to John Finnis, 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 41,
(1995); Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality, and Sexual
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difficulty, the peculiar claim that the married couple
become a single organism. This is an odd claim in any
case, but it becomes even odder when NNL insists that it is
also true of an infertile heterosexual couple.
Even when a heterosexual couple cannot reproduce,
Finnis writes, the “union of the reproductive organs of
husband and wife really unites them biologically (and their
biological reality is part of, not merely an instrument of,
their personal reality)”.19 Finnis explains that the
infertile married couple
who unite their reproductive organs in an act of
sexual intercourse which, so far as they can make
it, is of a kind suitable for generation, do
function as a biological (and thus personal) unit
and thus can be actualizing . . . the
two-in-one-flesh common good and reality of
marriage, even when some biological condition
happens to prevent that unity resulting in
generation of a child. Their conduct thus differs
radically from the acts of a husband and wife
whose intercourse is . . . sodomitic or by
fellatio or coitus interruptus.20
The radical difference here is difficult to discern. That
sterile heterosexual coitus could have been procreative in
some other possible world does not distinguish it from
homosexual sex.
The NNL distinction turns on the form of the act,
about which Lee and George write:
People who are not temporarily or permanently
infertile could procreate by performing exactly
the same type of act which the infertile married
couple perform and by which they consummate or
Complementarity, in Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and
Nature 239-40 (David Estlund & Martha Nussbaum eds. 1997); Paul J.
Weithman, A Propos of Professor Perry: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual
Ethics, 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 75 (1995); Martha C.
Nussbaum & Kenneth J. Dover, Dover and Nussbaum Reply to Finnis, in
Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of
Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 Virginia Law
Review 1515, 1649 (1994); John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB
Argument, 115 Ethics 501 (2005); Gareth Moore, Natural Sex: Germain
Grisez, Sex, and Natural Law, in The Revival of Natural Law:
Philosophical, Theological, and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez
School (Nigel Biggar & Rufus Black 2000); Nigel Biggar, Conclusion, in
The Revival of Natural Law; Nicholas Bamforth and David A. J. Richards,
Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural
Law (2007); and my works cited supra note 7.
19
Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, at 1066.
20
Id. at 1068.
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actualize their marital communion. The difference
between sterile and fertile married couples is
not a difference in what they do. Rather it is a
difference in a distinct condition which affects
what may result from what they do.21
I have stated my objection to this before. The
core difficulty is that the classification of marital
acts, including the infertile heterosexual couple but
excluding the homosexual couple, is arbitrary:
What sense does it make to postulate one type of
sexual activity as normative in this way, so that
heterosexual intercourse is held to be an act of
reproductive kind even if reproduction is not intended
and is known to be impossible? Why is it not equally
plausible to say that all acts of seminal ejaculation
are reproductive in kind, or to say that no acts of
seminal ejaculation are reproductive in kind, and that
reproduction is only an accidental consequence that
may ensue under certain conditions? There is nothing
in nature that dictates that the lines have to be
drawn in any of these ways.22
An infertile reproductive organ remains taxonomically a
reproductive organ, but if it is infertile, it is not a
reproductive organ “in the sense of power or potential.”23
It is not a reproductive organ in that sense. “A sterile
person‟s genitals are no more suitable for generation than
an unloaded gun is suitable for shooting. If someone
points a gun at me and pulls the trigger, he exhibits the
behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for shooting, but
it still matters a lot whether the gun is loaded and
whether he knows it.”24
The new natural lawyers‟ recent work largely repeats
their view rather than defending it against objections,25
21

Lee & George, What Sex Can Be, at 150.
Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question, at 86-87.
23
Id. at 88.
24
Id.
25
Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 Notre
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol‟y 729 (2000); John Finnis, “An
Intrinsically Disordered Inclination,” in Same-Sex Attraction: A
Parents‟ Guide 89 (John F. Harvey & Gerard V. Bradley eds. 2003);
Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and Sexual Liberation: Courts
and the Abolition of Marriage, 17 Regent U. L. Rev. 21 (2004); Gerard
V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 14 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol‟y 189 (2004); Patrick Lee, The Human Body and Sexuality in
the Teaching of Pope John Paul II, in John Paul II‟s Contribution to
Catholic Bioethics 107 (Christopher Tollefsen ed. 2004); John Finnis,
Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good, 91 The Monist 388 (2008); Gerard
V. Bradley, What‟s In a Name? A Philosophical Critique of „Civil
22
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but Lee and George have responded to me in some detail.26
In response to the problem of the infertile couple, they
write:
But our claim is not that in a marital act, one must
intend to procreate, hope to procreate, or even think
that procreation is in these circumstances possible.
Our claim is that a marital act is an act in which a
man and woman, as complementary, become bodily and
organically one, in that they jointly perform a single
act, single in that it is an act that is biologically
oriented to procreation, though some other condition
in the agents may prevent the completion of that
orientation in this act.27
It is not clear what is doing the work here. Perhaps it is
the proposition that the couple “become bodily and
organically one” because they are engaged in a reproductive
type of act. But they do not become a single organism even
if they happen to conceive.
Lee and George concede that “[n]ot every instance of
two entities sharing in an action are instances of two
entities becoming biologically one.” The act of
reproduction, however,
can be actualized only in cooperation with the
opposite sex of the species. The reproductive bodily
parts are internally oriented toward actuation
together with the bodily parts of the opposite sex.
So, although the bodily parts of the male and the
female are not interdependent for their continued life
(as the bodily parts are to each other in a male
Unions‟ Predicated Upon a Sexual Relationship, 91 The Monist 606
(2008). George and Bradley have also invoked these arguments to
justify the criminalization of homosexual sex and a constitutional
amendment against same-sex marriage. Robert P. George, The Concept of
Public Morality, 45 Am. J. Jurisprudence 17, 30-31 (2000); Robert P.
George, One Man, One Woman: The Case for Preserving the Definition of
Marriage, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2003; Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and
Fight: Don‟t Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, National Rev., July 28,
2003; Robert P. George, The 28th Amendment, National Rev., July 23,
2001.
26
Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary
Ethics and Politics 191-93, 197-204 (2007); Robert P. George, What‟s
Sex Got to Do With It? Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, in The
Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market, and Morals 142 (Robert P.
George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006); see also Patrick Lee,
Marriage, Procreation, and Same-Sex Unions, 91 The Monist 422 (2008);
Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Male-Female Complementarity Makes
Possible: Marriage as a Two-in-One-Flesh Union, 69 Theol. Stud. 641
(2008)(responding to similar objections).
27
Lee and George, Body-Self Dualism, at 204.
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organism or the bodily parts to each other in a female
organism) there is a real biological unity between
them.28
The logic packed into the word “So” at the beginning of the
final sentence is obscure. In reproduction, two entities
share in a bodily action. That does not mean that they
become one, even though the action they perform could not
be performed by either of them individually. Two pianists
playing a four hands piece do not become biologically one,
even though they are using parts of their bodies in a
complementary way.
To defend his claim of organic unity, George cites a
thought experiment proposed to him in conversation by
Grisez:
Imagine a type of bodily, rational being that
reproduces, not by mating, but by some individual
performance. Imagine that for these beings, however,
locomotion or digestion is performed not by
individuals, but only by biologically complementary
pairs that unite for this purpose. Would anybody have
difficulty understanding that in respect of
reproduction the organism performing the function is
the individual, while in respect of locomotion or
digestion the organism performing the function is the
united pair? Would anybody deny that the unity
effectuated for purposes of locomotion or digestion is
an organic unity?29
The thought experiment does not lead where Grisez
intends. Let‟s suppose, to specify, that these beings have
half the body of a human being, clumsily hopping about on a
single leg, fulfilling the threat of Zeus in Aristophanes‟s
speech from Plato‟s Symposium.30 In this fashion they can
barely move at all by themselves (they keep falling on
their one-eyed faces), while they can walk very efficiently
if a left half and a right half grab each other‟s upper
bodies tightly.
Whey they walk, thus connected, certainly it is the
united pair that is walking. It does not follow that they
are “an organic unity,” much less a single organism. They
are simply cooperating in a joint task. Two organisms
engaged in symbiotic cooperation remain two organisms. In
a lichen, the fungus and the algae do not become a single
organism.
28
29
30

Id. at 183 n. 15.
George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It? at 158-59.
Plato, Symposium 190d.
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Even if the couple does not become a single organism,
George can still say that their coitus “is an act that is
oriented to procreation.” But it is obscure how an act can
be oriented to procreation when procreation is known to be,
not merely unlikely, but actually impossible. If the two
Aristophanean halves grabbed hold of each other and waved
their legs while suspended in midair on a bungee, would
their action be oriented to locomotion? Could the
locomotive character of their motion be a source of its
goodness? Would that goodness be absent if two left-sided
half-people (who could not walk together) waved their legs
together while hanging from the same bungee?
George notes that coition is only one part of the
reproductive process, and that as a part of the process, it
can be completed by the infertile couple:
In performing this first part of the reproductive
process together, the male and the female act as a
single unit, even where in many cases the second part
of the process cannot (for any of a variety of causes)
be completed. . . . A condition, or even a defect,
which prevents the second part of the process cannot
change the fact that the male and the female did
actually unite – become organically one – in the first
part of that process. If conception does occur, it
won‟t be until several hours later (at the earliest);
and whether they now become one cannot depend on
events that occur only later.31
There is a deep confusion here. My action can make
sense as part of a process, can take its meaning from its
role in facilitating that process, only if the process is
known to be capable of completion. This is true even if
the success of the project is unlikely. But it is not true
if success is impossible.
A surgeon trying to save the life of a gravely sick
patient is engaged in the practice of medicine even if the
patient‟s death is almost certain. No guarantee of success
is necessary. (Little human endeavor comes with a
guarantee of success.) So long as the patient is alive and
the surgery even marginally increases the likelihood of the
patient‟s survival, then the surgeon‟s behavior makes
perfect sense. He is engaged in a medical-type act.
Whether it is a medical-type act now cannot depend on
events that occur only later, such as the patient‟s
recovery.

31

George, What‟s Sex Got to Do With It? at 162.
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But what would we think if the surgeon performed
exactly the same actions, involving the same bodily
motions, when the patient is already dead? George writes
that
the only behavior which the partners have direct
control over is coition itself, performed in such a
way as to fulfill the behavioral conditions of
reproduction. This is the only act, the only
behavior, which they directly perform, and it disposes
them to procreation (rather than being the direct act
of procreating). Thus, the other conditions (an
adequate sperm count, time of ovulation, etc.) are not
part of the couple‟s behavior, not part of what they
do.32
Try this logic on the surgeon as he operates on the corpse.
All of George‟s verbal moves are available here, but the
result will be pretty weird:
The only behavior which the surgeon has direct control
over is surgery itself, performed in such a way as to
fulfill the behavioral conditions of the patient‟s
recovery. This is the only act, the only behavior,
which he directly performs, and it disposes him to
healing (rather than being the direct act of healing,
which in every case of medicine may or may not
happen). Thus, the other conditions (a patient who is
alive at the time of the surgery, etc.) are not part
of the surgeon‟s behavior, not part of what he does.
George adds that “a second reason” why infertile
spouses‟ marital acts “are reproductive in kind is that
they bespeak and bear witness to the intrinsic goodness of
marriage, the kind of community that is naturally fulfilled
by the bearing and rearing of children.”33 But this is not
a second reason at all. It is the first reason restated.
If the couple do not unite organically, if their actions
aren‟t intelligible because of their relationship to
reproduction, then there is no “intrinsic goodness of
marriage,” in the sense in which he means these words, for
their acts to bespeak and bear witness to.
It is one of the facts about the human capacity for
signification that anything can bespeak anything. You can
sprinkle the fairy dust anywhere you like: you could
attribute goodness only to the sex acts of Chicago White
Sox fans who copulate on Tuesdays. But the new natural
lawyers have not identified a distinctive, intelligible
32
33

Id. at 163.
Id. at 164-65.
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category of action to which intrinsic goodness can be shown
uniquely to attach.
Geach‟s new strategy
Geach does not rely on the claim that the married
heterosexual couple unites biologically.34 She does,
however, think that their coupling matters because of its
relation to procreation. Her central claims are that there
is a distinctive sexual virtue for human beings, that this
virtue marks the boundaries of permissible sexual conduct
in the ways earlier enumerated, and that this is so
for two related reasons: firstly, because the sense
of marriage as an integral whole is part of the
psychic makeup of the virtuous man, a part which is
damaged when we use our bodies in a way which treats
this whole as a collection of separable parts, and
secondly, because it belongs to the good order of
human society that marriage should be presumable as
the sexual relation.35
She agrees with NNL that heterosexual marriage, defined as
NNL defines it, is an ultimate, noninstrumental good. Her
claims about sexual virtue are parasitic on this ultimate
value claim. Her task, then, is to persuade the reader to
see the distinctive human end that she sees.
This presents a rhetorical challenge, for her as much
as for NNL. The basic problem, George observes, is that
"intrinsic values, as ultimate reasons for action, cannot
be deduced or inferred. We do not, for example, infer the
intrinsic goodness of health from the fact, if it is a
fact, that people everywhere seem to desire it. . . . We
see the point of acting for the sake of health, in
ourselves or in others, just for its own sake, without the
benefit of any such inference."36 If the value of health is
defended as a means to some other end, then the question
will arise why that is a good thing; the chain of reasoning
has to conclude somewhere, with some good that is deemed
good in itself and not as a means to something else. The
intrinsic nature of intrinsic goods can only be defended
dialectically:

34

She offers formulations that approach this claim in Lying at 524 and
548-49, but it is peripheral to her argument. Unlike the NNL
theorists, her argument would not be weakened if it were rejected.
35
Geach, Lying, at 528.
36
Robert P. George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, in In
Defense of Natural Law 48 (1999).
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While they may be defended by dialectical
arguments designed either to rebut arguments
against them, or to show up the defects or
inadequacies of ethical theories that attempt to
do without them, they cannot themselves be
deduced or inferred or derived from more
fundamental premises. One cannot argue one's way
to them (the way one can, on the basis of more
fundamental premises, argue one's way to a
conclusion). The claim that they are selfevident does not imply that they are undeniable
or, still less, that no one denies them. What it
does imply is that the practical intellect may
grasp them, and practical judgment can affirm
them without the need for a derivation. (Which
is not to say that they can be grasped without an
understanding of the realities to which they
refer.)37
Geach acknowledges the difficulty of
demonstrating her core account of the virtue concerned
with sex, a virtue that takes its character from both
human nature and from the good that sexuality is
directed toward. “One can‟t prove the first
principle, in the sense of demonstrating it as the
logical consequence of some other principle.”38
Instead, she proposes to follow a procedure common in
natural science: to “form an hypothesis which covers
the facts, and then see whether things do happen in
accordance with this hypothesis.”39 The evidence that
supports her hypothesis is “[t]he benefits of
marriage” and, more importantly (since most supporters
of gay rights do not deny that heterosexual marriage
has benefits), “the ills resulting from disordered
sexuality.”40
To begin with, there is the importance, for any human
civilization, of an ethic of chastity, especially among
37

Id. at 45.
Geach, Lying, at 529. As she puts it elsewhere: “I don‟t think we
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women. In all of the world‟s great civilizations, “the
chastity of women is highly valued, and there is also some
idea of a corresponding virtue of men.”41 Female chastity
is important so men can know who their children are, and
only men who know that will do the hard work of supporting
women and children. Fathers also have “the strength and
will to control [children] and teach them respect for
authority and for law. . . . If the men laze around leaving
everything to the women, and if the women whore around so
that no one knows who his father is, then everything will
decay, and the people will no longer respect duly
constituted authority and laws but will rather be ruled by
servile fear or inarticulate adherence to custom.”42
Civilization requires, then, that “the virtuous of both
sexes have a profound state of mind inclining them to
faithfulness in marriage.”43 All of these facts point to
the truth of the good of marriage as Geach conceives it.
That good “stands to our sexual actions in a relation
similar to that in which the truth conditions of a
proposition stand to the assertion of it.”44 Orientation
toward marriage as she understands it explains the state of
mind necessary for marital chastity. It also explains and
provides a justification for sexual jealousy,45 it explains
the importance of consent to sex,46 it explains why lovers
yearn for a permanent union.47
Pleasure, on the other hand, is “an aspect, but not an
end,”48 of the marriage act. When it is disconnected from
any good of which it could be a part, pleasure is not in
itself good. “If someone has such sensations in connection
with the pain suffered by others, should we say that,
though the pain was bad, his erotic sensations were good?
Or that his delight in these sensations was good? Surely
not.”49 Rather, these sensations are “about something, and
what they are about should be appropriate, which we realize
41
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Id. at 539.
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Id. at 547.
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when we consider how stupid and mad our sexuality can make
us.”50
Miracle, mystery, and authority:

Wax

All this evidence about the value of the old sexual
ethic, even if it is accepted (I will offer some cautions
below), doesn‟t get Geach to the conclusion she is after.
It is consistent with the view, which she rejects, that
there is no genuine moral requirement of chastity to which
this ethic responds.
It might be that the norm of chastity, as she
conceives it, is a socially useful illusion. This is how
Friedrich Hayek thought about religious belief. Hayek
thought that the persistence of customs conducive to social
cooperation was closely tied to the support those customs
received from religion. Of course, not all religions had
this beneficent effect. “Among the founders of religions
over the last two thousand years, many opposed property and
the family. But the only religions that have survived are
those which support property and the family.”51 The process
by which the pertinent selection occurred may have been
invisible to those who benefited from it. “Customs whose
beneficial effects were unperceivable by those practicing
them were likely to be preserved long enough to increase
their selective advantage only when supported by some other
strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or magic
faiths were readily available to perform this role.”52 What
matters is that the customs that survived were the ones
that “influence[ed] men to do what was required to maintain
the structure enabling them to nourish their enlarging
numbers.”53 The value of religion, for Hayek, is that it
enables people to engage, “peacefully though competitively,
in pursuing thousands of different ends of their own
choosing in collaboration with thousands of persons whom
they will never know.”54 Hayek himself was an atheist who
regarded the notion of God as unintelligible;55 he regarded
religion as a functionally valuable fiction. For Hayek,
cooperation-inducing rules need not be adopted for that
50
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purpose: “Neither the groups who first practised these
rules, nor those who imitated them, need ever have known
why their conduct was more successful than that of others,
or helped the group persist.”56
Something like Hayek‟s view is evident in the
objections to same-sex marriage developed by Amy Wax.57
Wax‟s claims are not the same as Geach‟s, because she
focuses solely on same-sex marriage and does not claim that
homosexual sex is per se immoral. Her concern is public
mythos, not private conduct.
Wax worries that recognition of same-sex marriage
could weaken or transform the conventions surrounding
heterosexual marriages:
The fear is that, if the institution of marriage is
reshaped to give priority to diversity, choice, and
individual prerogatives--and if marital roles are
redefined to fit different homosexual and heterosexual
lifestyles--then behavior surrounding all marital
relations may change in response. Those changes may
not be beneficial. For example, if homosexuals are
less likely to have children, procreation might become
less central to marriage. This might foster a model of
marriage that views children as optional or even
unimportant. Or, in keeping with past commitments and
rhetoric, homosexual couples might place less emphasis
on sexual fidelity or be more tolerant of sexual
infidelity within their relationships. The existence
of a significant number of “open marriage” homosexual
couples might affect how heterosexuals view their own
commitments, with potentially unsettling or disruptive
consequences.58
At no point does Wax suggest that the sexual lives of
gay people are per se inferior to those of heterosexuals,
or in any way immoral. She is simply concerned about the
56
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effect of their acceptance on the broader social ecology.
It‟s really the heterosexuals that she‟s worried about.
The old sexual scripts are a solution to their perennial
problems, most prominently the difficulty of forging bonds
between fathers and children.
Because most people are incapable of reasoning through
every dilemma of social life on their own, they depend
on off-the-shelf scripts that define basic duties and
provide transparent guidelines for behavior in
commonplace social situations. Simple, unyielding
rules maximize the chance that persons of limited
intellect and self-control will negotiate complex
human interactions successfully. As such, these
scripts should be as clear and unequivocal as
possible. Formal institutions such as marriage, by
embodying a simple and transparent set of
expectations, help facilitate moral conduct by
ordinary people.59
Wax values these off-the-shelf scripts for the same reason
as Hayek. It is an unhappy fact of social life that most
people depend on miracle, mystery, and authority.
For the most part, Wax‟s focus is not on gay people,
but on the feared effects of legitimizing homosexuality on
the wider, heterosexual population. However, she does
raise concerns about gay people raising children (which
will happen more often if gays marry). She cites studies
showing that children thrive better when raised by their
married biological parents than by other combinations, such
as “[c]hildren in single parent families, children born to
unmarried mothers, and children in step-families or
cohabiting relationships.”60 These concerns do not
necessarily bar recognition of same-sex marriage:
“enhanced risks for children, especially if modest, may not
warrant abandoning reforms motivated by a firm commitment
to rights and equality.”61
These studies, without more, can‟t provide even mild
support for the case against same-sex marriage. Same-sex
couples are already raising large numbers of children, and
will continue to do so whether or not same-sex marriage is
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recognized.62 Withholding recognition just makes these
children‟s lives less stable. Moreover, whatever the
deficits of the kinds of households listed, there is no
evidence that children raised by same-sex couples do worse
than children raised by heterosexual couples.63 The
household types are too different to support any inference
from one to the other. In households with stepfathers, for
example, the introduction of a new adult into the household
is yet another disruption in children‟s lives; stepfathers
are less likely to be committed to the child‟s welfare and
less likely to be a check on the mother‟s behavior; they
sometimes compete with the child for the mother‟s time; the
mother may be reluctant to share authority with the
stepfather.64 None of these problems are likely to be
present in children of same-sex couples. Wax worries that
those children are likely to face other, analogous
problems. But if this were true, would there not be some
evidence of it?
Her conclusion, on the basis of this evidence, that
the heterosexual nuclear family is the “gold standard” for
family form,65 and that “[c]hildren do best if their entire
childhood is spent with both their biological parents,”66 is
like saying that, given that a poodle is bigger than a
squirrel or a butterfly, it follows that the poodle is
bigger than any other animal.
To Hell in a Handbasket, and Back
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Geach, on the other hand, thinks that homosexuality is
immoral regardless of its social effects. Even private
homosexual conduct that no one else ever knows about is
immoral.
Geach‟s claim would be stronger if it could be shown,
not merely that the ethic she describes is useful for some
societies, but that human society cannot flourish without
it. If a sexual ethic is merely a noble lie, then people
can dispense with it if they are able to consciously and
directly pursue the purpose that the noble lie serves.
Hayek thought that religion inadvertently served the cause
of economic growth, but his own philosophy aimed at growth
without relying on what he regarded as childish
mystifications, and he has many followers. If, on the
other hand, it turns out that those who turn away from the
ancient ways inevitably come to wreck, this would be
evidence that those ways are, indeed, part of the fabric of
human nature.
So Geach moves on, to enumerate the pathologies
produced by our present civilization‟s relaxed sexual
mores.67 The relaxed attitude toward masturbation and
sexual fantasy is destructive, because orgasmic fantasy
“seriously undermines one‟s sense of reality, and damages
one‟s ability to empathise with other people, because the
use of one‟s sexuality signifies another party, and one has
been using it when no other party was present.”68 This
“explains the nastiness of some adolescents, and of some
single people.”69 The absence of clear conventions about
the limits of what unmarried men may do generates the
problem of date rape.70 The acceptance of homosexuality
damages all relations between persons of the same sex, by
making non-sexual friendship harder than it once was
because it is now tainted by sexual fear and avoidance.71
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The acceptance of homosexuality tends to place society on a
path of “decay to the point where there is no separate
class of homosexuals, but one undifferentiated lustful
multitude.”72 Most alarmingly, “where there is a widespread
abuse of human sexuality, life will come to seem
meaningless and many will commit suicide.”73 And, in fact,
“in our comfortable and apparently happy society . . .
suicide happens a great deal.”74
Our society “is in a
state of decadence, and with its aging population and
weapons of mass destruction seems to be heading towards its
end.”75 These are categorical claims about the destructive
effects of sexual vice on human nature. No Hayekian elite
could evade its malign power.
Geach despises cruelty and self-deception, and cares
urgently about the future of civilization. Her humane
impulses are admirable. But one must have a heart of stone
to read her catalogue of horrors without laughing. Her
theories about the catastrophic effects of masturbation are
only the latest of a long series of delusions about the
practice, all focusing (as she does) on the fear that young
people would withdraw entirely from society, pursuing
pleasures that were asocial and autarkic.76 Just how much
special discernment does it really take to avoid raping
your date? I can‟t think of a single instance in which
I‟ve experienced the hesitation with my friends (including
my gay friends) that Geach frets about. As the sexual
revolution has unfolded in the United States and England,
the suicide rate has been steadily declining.77
The new middle class ethic

72
73
74
75

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 533.
at 544.

at 556 n.17.
THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION (2003);
WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 138–43 (1988);
HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES OVER SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 92–93, 97–107, 394–403 (2003).
77
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Health, United States, 2008, at 258-60, Table
45, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf (visited
July 22, 2009); National Mental Health Development Unit, National
Suicide Prevention Strategy for England, Annual Report on Progress
2008, at 13-14 (“The suicide rate for the year 2007, the most recent
available, was the lowest recorded.”), available at
http://www.nmhdu.org.uk/silo/files/national-suicide-preventionstrategy-for-england--annual-report-on-progress-2008.pdf (visited July
22, 2009).
76

20

Geach and Wax are right to ask about the costs of
relaxing the old rules. As noted earlier, Wax has plenty
of data that show that children tend to do best when raised
by their biological parents, and that single motherhood is
especially hard on children. Both of them are right that
it would be a mistake to discard the old ethic and replace
it with an ethic of individual self-fulfillment, leaving
men free to scatter their seed at will.
Society needs an ethic that binds fathers to children.
But there is more than one candidate for that job. The
story of the modern sexual revolution is not merely the
story of the decay of the old ways. It has also seen the
emergence of a new ethic, one that in many ways produces
stronger, more functional families that serve children‟s
needs better than the old model.
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone observe that two different
family systems, presupposing different norms, now exist in
the United States. The older, more traditional model
encourages marriage relatively soon after (if not
before) the beginning of sexual activity, identifies
responsible childbearing with family form rather than
economic self-sufficiency or emotional maturity, and
embraces more authoritarian models of parenting and
the state -- both should be able and willing to
intervene to promote the “right” moral values. . . .
{A]bstinence outside of marriage is a moral
imperative, the shotgun marriage is the preferred
solution to an improvident pregnancy, and
socialization into traditional gender roles is
critical to marital stability. Abortion is an
abomination not only because it violates religious
teachings about the beginning of life, but also
because it represents a determination to evade the
consequences of immoral conduct. And gay marriage is,
if anything, worse than abortion – the symbol of at
the ability to flout moral teachings in the name of
individualism and choice.78
This model remains prevalent in much of the United States.
But it has costs. Where it prevails, divorce rates are the
highest in the country, because early marriages are the
most likely to fail. Teen pregnancy and single motherhood
are frequent. The problem is that, although this ethic has
considerable continuing power, it is in decay. Its
enforcement mechanisms have weakened. Unhappy couples can
78
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no longer be forced to stay together, and teenagers can‟t
be prevented from having sex.
At the same time, a new sexual ethic has emerged.
This newer model, which Cahn and Carbone call the “new
middle class ethic,”
involves less control of sexuality, celebrates more
egalitarian gender roles, and promotes financial
independence and emotional maturity as the sine qua
non of responsible parenthood. The hallmarks of the
new system‟s success are lower rates of divorce and
teen births; its weaknesses may ultimately be falling
fertility and high percentages of the population
living alone. In this new model, abstinence is
unrealistic, contraception is not only permissible,
but morally compelled, and abortion is the necessary
(and responsible) fallback.79
Delayed childbearing facilitates more education, which in
turn leads to higher incomes later in life. The newer
model is no less functional than the old one. Indeed, from
the standpoint of child welfare, it has obvious advantages,
since it produces less divorce and more mature parenting.
The new model is most prevalent among the most
educated classes, who have the highest incomes. The
differences are starkly revealed in patterns of single
childbearing. In 1960, about 14% of mothers in the bottom
education quartile were single, compared with 4.5% of
mothers in the top quartile. By 2000, the respective
percentages were 43% and 7%. College-educated women are
more likely to marry than other women, and less likely to
divorce. The disparity appears to have much to do with
delayed childbearing by educated women, which in turn is
the result of contraception and abortion.80
Integral to this model is greater tolerance of
homosexuality. Since this model separates sex from
reproduction and values recreational sex, it is not
particularly threatened by sex that manifestly has nothing
to do with procreation. Tolerance for homosexuality
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correlates strongly with high levels of education and
income.81
The greater stability of these high-income families is
directly related to their abandonment of the ethic that
Geach and Wax are hoping to preserve. Their children do
better because the parents have separated sex from
reproduction. Support for gay rights will not corrode
these families. Many of them already support gay rights,
and they are doing fine.82
Wax thinks that “[f]amily disintegration is almost
surely the product of a multi-pronged assault on
conventional strictures and understandings from many
quarters, with factors like the availability of birth
control, changes in divorce laws, feminism, the sexual
revolution, and the courts' recognition of children's and
parental rights outside of marriage playing some role.”83
The phenomena she describes are, however, equally present
in the top-quartile and bottom-quartile families, and
cannot explain the differences between them. In fact, the
upper-income families have replicated the statistics of 40
years ago, and in some respects their children are doing
even better: their households are more prosperous, and
they spend more time with their fathers.84
The poorest Americans do have a tendency (only a
tendency; more than half of bottom-quartile mothers are
married) to exhibit precisely the kind of sexual ethic that
Geach fears, with the disastrous consequences that she
predicts. Men casually impregnate women. The women raise
the children with difficulty. The men are disconnected
from the next generation. The children, especially the
boys, are poorly socialized. The pattern repeats from one
generation to the next.
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The causes of these patterns are not well understood.
One survey concludes that the most widely cited papers are
“those that disprove a popular explanation, not those that
support one.”85
What does appear clear is that the greater prevalence
of unmarried motherhood among the poor is caused, in part
(no one knows how large a part), by the vestiges of the old
ethic, which has decayed unevenly. Prohibitions that were
functional in context have become pernicious in new
circumstances. The stigma of using birth control has, for
some populations, decayed more slowly than the stigma of
premarital sex: sex is something unexpected that happens
to you, while contraception identifies you as a bad girl
who plans for sex.86 The stigma of unwed motherhood is
sometimes felt less strongly than the stigma of divorce.87
The unavailability of contraception to low-income women
also increases the likelihood of pregnancy,88 and
abstinence-focused sex education increases the likelihood
that a girl will not even know how to contracept when she
has her first sexual experience.89
Among the poorest Americans, there is a third sexual
ethic, which is more tolerant of childbearing outside of
marriage than either of the other two. (This is less
distinctively an ethic than the other two, since it is not
so much a norm of childbearing as a pattern of response to
births that are often unplanned and unwelcome. What
matters here is that it cannot be conflated with either of
the other two.90) It is not, however, Geach‟s nightmare of
a world in which people feel contempt for marriage.
Poor Americans have the same high expectations for a
marriage partner and an ideal marital relationship that
rich Americans do. They do not, however, regard marriage
as a prerequisite for childbearing, and they think that
having a child together is not a sufficient reason to
85
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marry. Nor is cohabitation: one large study of children
of urban unmarried parents found that 83 percent of out-ofwedlock births to adult women were to romantically involved
couples, about half of which were living together when the
child was born.91 Rather, they tend to think that marriage
should be reserved for couples who can afford a mortgage on
a home, a car, some savings, and money to pay for a
wedding. Couples who eventually meet these economic goals
do tend to marry once they have done so.
The low marriage rate is in part a product of
circumstances.92 The poor marry at a lower rate because
most are unable to meet this higher standard. If they
could meet it, the standard would do less damage. A
substantial obstacle is many low-income men‟s unstable
employment, low educational attainment, drug use, violence,
and frequent encounters with the criminal justice system.93
That, in turn, is the product of soft employment markets,
bad schools, and drug laws that send huge number of young
men to prison without significantly controlling drug
markets. Poor women‟s sexual behavior is in many ways a
rational response to these circumstances. College
education is out of the question for many, and they
perceive no reason to delay childbearing. Since life
expectancy is short, there are also substantial costs to
delay.
A different ethic about sex might help some of these
these people. Either of the two other American models
would be an improvement. Under the old model, they would
abstain from sex until they are married, and they would
delay marriage until their early twenties. Under the new
middle-class model, they would be sexually active during
those years, but would carefully use contraception. Which
ethic do you suppose is an easier sell in contemporary
America?94
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Wax is well aware of the class divergence in
childbearing patterns that I have described here. She
describes it herself, in an article that is not explicitly
about same-sex marriage, but which concludes with the claim
that these patterns are “reason to question our enthusiasm
for innovative family forms and to support the revival of
marriage and traditional family structures.”95 Her own data
indicate, however, that it is precisely the more innovative
family form – the “new middle class ethic,” which needs no
revival - that is most successfully looking after
children‟s needs in contemporary America. Her caution that
we should focus on “what actually works in practice to help
shape human choice and nurture the most desirable human
relationships”96 is pertinent here.
The new middle-class ethic, to the extent that it is
tolerant of same-sex unions, is a departure from the core,
traditional purposes of marriage. Maggie Gallagher, who
opposes same-sex marriage for reasons much like Wax‟s,
correctly observes that marriage came into existence, and
primarily continues to function, “to manage the procreative
consequences of sexual attraction between men and women.”97
Same-sex marriage (absent children, although in fact
children are often present) does not directly serve that
function. But the real question is whether the goods that
have traditionally been realized (when all went well) in
that practice can also be realized in other social units
that don‟t correspond to the traditional definition.98
only 44% think that abortion should be legal in few or no
circumstances. Lydia Saad, More Americans “Pro-Life” Than “Pro-Choice”
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We wouldn‟t have the institution of marriage without
procreation. But what‟s wrong with using an institution
for unanticipated purposes? The authors of the federal
Constitution, many of whom owned slaves, did not intend the
use of federal power to abolish slavery. The builders of
the Parthenon did not intend that it be maintained as an
attraction for tourists and scholars. Saddam Hussein did
not intend that his presidential palaces be used to house a
democratically elected government. When a novel use of an
inherited institution is proposed, the question ought to be
whether that use is a good one, not whether it is
consistent with the institution‟s original purpose.
My real disagreement with Wax has to do with the
importance of miracle, mystery, and authority. The old
ethic did its job for a long time. But to say that
children can‟t thrive without the old sexual morality
because they need to be connected with their fathers is
like saying that animals can‟t live on land because they
need gills to breathe. I‟m not persuaded that people have
to be fooled into being good parents. I repeat what I said
before: I have three kids, and I don‟t think I stick
around because I‟m mystified or confused.99
The basic Burkean point, that ancient rules probably
have a rational basis or they wouldn‟t have survived so
will be a unisex relationship, unconnected to sex, babies or family
structure.” Maggie Gallagher, Maggie‟s Reply to Andrew Koppelman on
Marriage and Same-Sex Marriage, Oct. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/mdblog/2005_10_02_mdblog_archive.htm.
Here‟s a nice test of whether marriage, disconnected to reproduction,
will have that consequence. Arizona and Wisconsin have statutes that
allow first cousins to marry only if they can‟t procreate. (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. 25-101(B); Wisc. Stat. Ann. 765.03.) How alarmed ought we to be
about these laws? Do they install “a new definition of marriage, one
disconnected from its historic meaning, purpose and function”? Id. Is
this “going to make it much harder for parents and faith communities to
promote the understanding that marriage is about generativity:
connecting mothers and fathers to the children they make”? Id.
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Law and Social Equality (1996), arguing that the shaping of social
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Koppelman, On the Moral Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 Maryland
L. Rev. 777 (2001). What I doubt is that same-sex marriage will have
the specific social meaning Gallagher claims it will: an invitation
for men to desert their wives and children. I doubt that any father on
the planet will interpret it that way.
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long, is sound. But conditions change. Compare the
prohibition of usury. In the primitive agrarian societies
of Biblical times, a loan was likely to be a response to
unexpected disaster, and the ban on charging interest was a
way of preventing people from exploiting others‟
misfortunes. As modern commercial conditions changed, and
finance became an unavoidable prerequisite of business,
casuists quickly figured out that conditions had changed
and so the old rules had to be modified.100
There is a moral anchor amid this historical
contingency: the idea that people have value, that their
needs should be looked after, and that it‟s wrong to regard
another person as merely a source of economic gain. With
sex as with lending, people shouldn‟t stand toward one
another in the relation of predator and prey.101
The old rules of sex are valuable because they cope
with the problem of unintended pregnancy, which hasn‟t gone
away. But the old rules turn out to have costs. Most
obviously, people want to be happy, and the ban on divorce
is a problem for that.102 The ban on contraception never
made a lot of sense, absent condemnation of pleasure in
sex. And, of course, the cost to gay people of the
traditional sexual ethic was extremely high. So a more
flexible set of rules have developed: premarital sex is
fine as long as contraception is carefully used; there‟s a
strong presumption against adultery (though some married
couples have tolerated it, and some even testify that
tolerating it has helped hold their marriages together). A
100
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central task of modern sexual ethics is to figure out what
is living and what is dead in the old rules about sex, and
where the lines are now to be drawn.103 The eminently
responsible parental behavior of the people who have most
firmly embraced the new ethic suggests that that ethic is
less dangerous than Geach and Wax fear.
Geach observes that I have not attempted to offer “an
account of sexual virtue in general.”104 The emergence of
the new middle class ethic suggests that there is no such
thing as a single sexual virtue for all human beings. The
ethic that demands premarital chastity, above all of women,
evidently is not indispensable in all societies.
This is not the place to answer Geach‟s challenge, but
I can say a few things about sexual virtue as I understand
it. Begin with the noncontroversial, though perhaps
trivial, premise that virtue is a disposition to choose
well. Sexual virtue is a disposition to make good choices
about sex. This has negative and positive implications.
Begin with the negative.
Sex is, in characteristic ways, a frequent occasion
for mistreatment of human beings: physical and emotional
abuse, manipulation and deception, the reckless spread of
disease, and the irresponsible begetting of children.
Since one should not mistreat people, a fortiori one should
not mistreat them in this sphere. The old and new sexual
ethics converge here, though they disagree about the best
strategy for avoiding such mistreatment.
There is also the question of the positive goal toward
which choice should aspire. The fundamental disagreement
between the old and new sexual ethics is here. I have
already stated why I am not persuaded by the account of
that telos offered by NNL and Geach. Can I offer anything
better?
I agree that the goodness of sex at its best has to do
with its character as a certain kind of interpersonal
communion. “Conversation,” Geach observes, “is delightful
because it is good to share thoughts in this way, and a
part of friendship (not just a means to friendship but a
part of what is constitutive of it) and we take pleasure,
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we delight in, what we find good.”105 Sex at its best is
something like conversation. It is not something you can
do by yourself. It is essentially interaction with another
person, an interaction in which you love and value me in my
wholeness, as body and mind and infantile neediness, and I
love and value you in the same way. When I am the object
of lust, this sometimes means that I am appreciated in the
full embodied particularity of my self, as I am not if you
only love me for my mind.106 Sexual virtue is a disposition
to pursue sex at its best.
It is only in this sense that Geach is correct that
the sex act is, “like the act of telling, a kind of human
act which is, as it were, there already for us to do, whose
generic nature is not formed by the agent‟s thought.”107
But she misapprehends the character of the goodness of the
act in question, which is not essentially related to its
procreative character. These goods are good without
reference to reproduction. It radically misunderstands the
point of nonreproductive sex to say that its purpose is
merely pleasure.
The telos of sex that I have described has
implications for the moral status of sex acts that fall
short of this interpersonal ideal. Many people are unable
to achieve the full goodness associated with sex at its
best, often because of the simple bad luck of never meeting
a suitable partner. When a given sexual act, one that
involves no mistreatment of another person, is the best
that is available for this person at this time, it is
uncharitable to condemn it. Sex at its best demands
generosity toward human neediness and imperfection.
There
is, then, something paradoxical and unvirtuous about
condemning sex for being imperfect.108 The stigmatization
of masturbation, for example, is senseless and destructive
precisely because of its brutal attitude toward sexual
neediness.
Finally, a word about pleasure. For the reasons just
stated, many of the couplings that Geach condemns are
aiming at something more than pleasurable sensations,
fundamentally private and meaningless. But it would be
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strange if pleasure were never a legitimate reason for
action. Would Geach deny that, in the intercourse of
married heterosexual couples that she valorizes, one
sometimes legitimately performs intentional actions for no
reason other than these give one‟s partner physical
pleasure?
The ex-gay movement as Trojan horse
There‟s a substantial problem about the people who are
left out of Geach‟s picture. If her ethic‟s contribution
to human flourishing is to be counted in its favor, then we
should pay some attention to the ways in which it crushes
the human spirit. There is a very large population of
people who are primarily sexually attracted to people of
the same sex. They comprise between two and ten percent of
the population.109 What are they supposed to do?
The costs of the homosexuality taboo are well-known,
but it is worth noting that those costs are being
registered even within the heart of the religious right in
America.
The October, 2007, issue of Christianity Today
included a fascinating piece about the evolution of the
“ex-gay” movement.110 The article inadvertently exposes a
major fault line in the Christian Right‟s position on
homosexuality.
The article, unsurprisingly given its venue, takes as
unquestioned premises that homosexual desire and homosexual
conduct are always evils to be avoided. It notes an
important shift in the claims being made by the “ex-gay”
movement, a primarily Christian movement that has been
around for some decades now, promising to lead gay people
away from homosexuality. In the early days of the
movement, it claimed that a gay person could transform himor herself into a heterosexual through a pure act of will.
Those claims have now disappeared. The article reports
that “[e]arly hopes for instant healing have given way to
belief that transformation occurs through a lifetime of
discipleship.”
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Alan Chambers, president of Exodus International, the
largest of the ex-gay groups,
is frank that change does not eradicate temptation. He
wonders if change is ever 100 percent complete in this
life. „One thing we can expect as Christians is a life
of denial,‟ he says. „I don't think we're afraid to
tell people that they may have a lifetime of struggle.
Freedom isn't the absence of struggle, but the life of
struggle with joy in the process.‟
The ex-gay movement seeks to integrate the
reality of same-sex attraction into a life of
discipleship. In that lifelong journey, they expect
many changes, including changes of feeling and
attraction. But they emphasize that each person's
experience is different, and that instant
transformation is extremely rare.
Not surprisingly then, ex-gay ministries appeal
almost exclusively to Christians. Most participants
come from evangelical backgrounds and can't resolve
their Christian faith with a gay identity.
An accompanying article111 describes a recent study of
“reparative therapy” (therapy that seeks to transform
sexual orientation). The study struggles to cast that
therapy in the best possible light. But among those who
were deemed to have successfully converted to heterosexual,
most
did not report themselves to be without experience of
homosexual arousal, and did not report heterosexual
orientation to be unequivocal and uncomplicated.
Sexual orientation for the individuals in this study
(and indeed for most of us) may be considerably more
complicated than commonly conceived, involving a
complex interplay of what we are instinctively
attracted to, what we can be attracted to with proper
attention and focus, what we choose to be attracted to
based on how we structure our interpersonal
environments, our emotional attachments, our broader
psychological functioning, (of course) our religious
and moral beliefs and values, and many more factors.
We believe the individuals who presented themselves as
heterosexual success stories at Time 3 are
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heterosexual in some meaningful but complicated sense
of the term.
The abandonment of the claim that sexual orientation
can easily be changed is very big news.
Poll data reveal
that those who think homosexuality is innate are
overwhelmingly likely to support gay rights, while those
who think homosexuality is a choice are likely to be
opposed. “Of those who consider it a choice,” a New York
Times poll reported in 1993, “only 18 percent rated it as
acceptable, compared with 57 percent of those who regard it
as something gay men and lesbians cannot change.”112
There‟s nothing illogical about thinking that
homosexuality is innate and nonetheless opposing gay
rights. One can regard it as an unfortunate fact of life
that some people are permanently denied sexual happiness.
The Christianity Today article ends on that note: “Our
attractions, always disordered to some extent, must be
submitted to Christ, who alone can redeem us. For those who
feel strong same-sex attractions, that task is especially
difficult. But it is the same basic struggle every
Christian must face.”
But that story is a hard sell. Americans like happy
endings. They like to think that if homosexual sex is
forbidden, then another avenue to sexual fulfillment is
easily available to gay people. That‟s why the leadership
of the Christian Right has tended to be quiet about the
ambiguities in the experience of those in the ex-gay
movement. As recent studies of the ex-gay movement have
shown, this has produced considerable tensions.113 One
committed member of the movement denounced the hypocrisy of
his fellow Christians:
Most of them can‟t handle the truth. If you‟re in the
church and you‟re a drug addict, murderer, whatever,
guys will come up to you and slap you on the ass.
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You‟re one of the guys. But if you state you struggle
with homosexuality, you get the whole pew to
yourself.114
The appearance of the Christianity Today article is a
significant event, because it shows that mainstream
conservative Christianity is now willing to admit these
uncomfortable facts. This, however, is a decidedly
unstable cultural formation. It is also liable to
slippage, as when Michael Bussee, one of the founders of
Exodus International, fell in love with one of the members.
They left the group together and never came back.115
The ex-gay movement is, wittingly or not, a
progressive force in American politics. It demands that
the immutability claim be taken seriously, and its members
are not easily dismissed by the religious right, because
they agree with the religious right about nearly everything
else. They have a credibility and a competence in the
pertinent theological claims that no one else can possibly
match. They are able to speak to their own cultural group,
in the same way that sophisticated Islamic feminist
theologians can speak to theirs.
Of course, it‟s possible to say that, even though
Geach‟s sexual ethic will not make people happy, even
though it will doom them to a life of struggle and
frustration, they should accept this, because that‟s the
right thing to do.
But this sits uneasily beside her invocation of the
happy lives of those who follow the path she prescribes.
Both “This is the Path to Happiness” and “Tough Luck,
Happiness Isn‟t for You” are coherent positions.116 But
it‟s hard to make them cohere with each other.
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Careful with that gun
There remains a difficulty about the line that Geach
draws to separate licit from illicit sex. The insistence
on a link between sex and reproduction raises a familiar
objection: why is it morally permissible for infertile
heterosexual couples to copulate?117
Like the new natural law theorists, Geach focuses on
the capacity of the heterosexual couple to engage in acts
of the reproductive kind. I have already reviewed the
objections to this claim. Geach, unlike the new natural
lawyers, does not claim that a copulating married couple
becomes a single organism. Rather she responds to these
difficulties in an original way. She is especially
provoked by the following passage from my work, in which I
elaborated on the gun example, discussed earlier.
Contingencies of deception and fright aside, all
objects that are not loaded guns are morally
equivalent in this context: it is not more wrong, and
certainly not closer to homicide, to point a gun known
to be unloaded at someone and pull the trigger than it
is to point one's finger and say, "bang!" And if the
two acts have the same moral character in this
context, why is the same not equally true of, on the
one hand, vaginal intercourse between a heterosexual
couple who know they cannot reproduce, and on the
other, anal or oral sex between any couple? Just as,
in the case of the gun, neither act is more homicidal
than the other, so in the sexual cases, neither act is
more reproductive than the other.118
Geach responds: “If gun-users in America make no such
distinction, this must cause a lot of nasty accidents.
Good gun practice treats the actions as utterly different:
distorted like a Francis Bacon picture, which illustrates the effects
of sodomy on the soul.” Id. at 554.
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one has to make a strict rule against ever pointing guns at
people unless one seriously means to shoot someone, and if
one killed someone by shooting him accidentally in this way
one would be to blame for his death.”119 If one does not
make good gun practice a habit, one damages oneself by
making oneself into the kind of gun-user who might kill
someone. This, Geach concedes, is not an absolute moral
rule; in narrowly defined circumstances, a departure from
good gun practice might be warranted, because it would not
necessarily damage the self in this way. “By contrast, a
sexual act which fails to be of generative kind directly
attacks the fabric and constitution of our nature, since
our sexuality and the significance of the marriage act are
part of that fabric and constitution.”120
The point about good gun practice doesn‟t add much to
the argument, since it rests on the contingency of human
limitations. If we had X-ray vision and could see
instantly whether a gun was loaded, good gun practice would
be different than it is. If the point is that we need to
habitually follow traditional sexual ethics because such
rules provide a socially useful framework, even if there is
no distinctive reason in any particular case to follow
them, this comes dangerously close to Wax‟s position.
The deeper question is one of coherence: does it make
sense to say that the significance of reproduction adheres
to an act that is known to be incapable of reproduction?
Geach‟s answer is the same as the NNL theorists:
“Generation, when it takes place normally, involves a joint
human act, which as a kind of human act is not defined as
involving, for instance, the expedition of viable sperm,
since the viability of sperm is a piece of recondite
information.”121 But in given circumstances, that
information may not be recondite at all. Sometimes we all
have the functional equivalent of X-ray vision. A man may
know perfectly well that he is infertile, or more commonly
(in a case such as post-menopausal sex) that his wife is.
Why is their coitus an act of the reproductive type, when
they know for certain that it cannot possibly produce a
pregnancy?
Geach observes that my objection presupposes that a
given moral character “cannot belong to an act as being of
a kind to produce a certain effect, unless it is in the
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circumstances liable to produce that effect.”122 But Geach
denies this:
Thus, I suppose, [Koppelman] would say that it could
make no difference to the moral character of one's
action whether one had or had not provided
information, if, as it happened, there was no way that
one would be believed when one made some assertion of
informative kind. But it could make a great difference
to whether one had done one's job, or made one's
protest, or warned one's enemies of the disaster about
to overtake them. To provide information is to make an
assertion of the kind called 'telling', which is
distinguished from other kinds of assertion by its
being an act of a kind to produce in the hearer belief
of the one making the assertion. The fact that one
will not be believed, however, does not mean that one
is not performing the act of telling, and whether or
not one has actually told someone something can make a
great difference to the character of one's action,
even if one is not trying to make him believe one.123
Much depends on what is meant by “the fact that one
will not be believed.” Suppose that I‟m trying to warn my
enemy that the bridge he‟s determined to cross is going to
collapse and plunge him to his death. I can be fairly
sure, given his characteristic stubbornness and stupidity,
that he‟s going to disregard my warning. I‟m obligated to
warn him nonetheless.
But when I do that, I have to use means that I think
have some chance of getting through to him, and I have to
reasonably hope that this time I will get through to him.
Stubborn, stupid people sometimes unexpectedly reform. (We
are born stubborn and stupid.) If it is absolutely
impossible for him to be informed, then my telling him is
as pointless as if I told him the truth in a foreign
language which he does not understand. One isn‟t
“performing an act of informative kind” if “one makes one‟s
statement out of earshot.”124
Geach thinks that the analogous case is that “one is
not performing an act of reproductive kind unless there is
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reproductive complementarity.”125 But why is my act of the
reproductive kind if I am ejaculating into an infertile
vagina (but not of the reproductive kind if I ejaculate
anywhere else)? Why isn‟t this just like a truthful
statement made out of earshot? As our discussion of Lee
and George, above, showed, a hopeless struggle is admirable
only if there is some rational vestige of hope present.
Otherwise it‟s just silly. The surgeon can‟t perform a
healing-type act upon a corpse. Come to think of it, it
doesn‟t make much sense to make a truthful statement to a
corpse, either.
Conclusion
A common refrain among opponents of same-sex marriage
– all the writers I have critiqued here partake of it - is
the importance of defending “the family.” They feel that
the institution of the family, as they conceive it, will be
undermined if same-sex marriages are recognized. This is a
peculiar kind of argument, and it traps them in a paradox
that has a remarkable historical precedent.
In the Civil War, the Southerners frequently declared
that they were fighting for liberty and self-government.
The title of James McPherson‟s history of the Civil War,
Battle Cry of Freedom, capitalizes on the fact that, as
McPherson writes, “[b]oth sides . . . professed to be
fighting for freedom.”126 Jefferson Davis declared in 1863
that the South was “forced to take up arms to vindicate the
political rights, the freedom, equality, and State
sovereignty which were the heritage purchased by the blood
of our revolutionary sires.”127 But the freedom that Davis
was fighting for depended, of course, on the enslavement of
others. The southern commissioners to Britain reported
home that “the public mind here is entirely opposed to the
Government of the Confederate States of America on the
question of slavery. . . . The sincerity and universality
of this feeling embarrass the government in dealing with
the question of our recognition.”128
Opponents of same-sex marriage today face a similar
embarrassment. They are eager to protect their distinctive
conception of family. But that conception depends on
marginalizing the families of others and denying them legal
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recognition. In the long run, the invocation of “family”
as a reason to beat up on gay people will seem as weird as
the invocation of “freedom” did as a defense of the
Confederacy.
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